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Introduction
One of the defining characteristics of effective leaders is their ability to coordinate the actions of team members through the successful communication of common goals (Bolton, Brunnermeier, and Veldkamp 2010) . Historically, most leaders have been men, and to the present date, women are rare in top decision-making positions. Does this gender disparity persist because men are more effective leaders than women? In this paper, we run a laboratory experiment to investigate whether male and female leaders are equally effective in a setting where the only factor determining team success is coordination among team members. Moreover, we distinguish between teams where leaders are selected by team members and teams where they are appointed exogenously.
As many, we study team production with strong complementarities by using the minimumeffort game (Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil 1990) . In the game, team members simultaneously choose among different effort levels but team output is determined by the lowest effort. Hence, team members face a tradeoff between exerting more effort but risking that their effort is wasted because other team members do not exert effort and exerting less effort and acquiescing to a low team output. In the laboratory, play in minimum-effort games often converges to the low-effort equilibrium (for an overview see Devetag and Ortmann 2007) .
A leader's role in the minimum-effort game is clear: convince other team members, the followers, that everyone will exert high effort. If followers believe others will be convinced by the leader, then it is in their best interest to exert high effort and the team will coordinate on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Previous work has demonstrated that giving leaders the option to send messages can substantially increase team coordination on high effort, even when a team has failed to coordinate in the past (e.g., Brandts and Cooper 2007; Sahin, Eckel, and Komai 2015; Weber et al. 2001) . We use the degree to which leaders can "turnaround" a team by using nonbinding pre-play messages as our measure of leader effectiveness.
We distinguish between two broad reasons why men might be more effective leaders than women in our setting. A first reason is that male leaders might behave differently than female leaders. In particular, for a given likelihood that followers will comply with a leader's message, the fact that men are generally less risk averse (see Croson and Gneezy 2009) 1 and more overconfident (Reuben et al. 2012) suggests that male leaders are more willing to request high effort from their followers and choose high effort themselves. A second reason is that followers might hold a general belief that others are more likely to follow a message if a man sends it. If this is the case, then male leaders would be more effective even if they send the same effort request as female leaders. Given that men have historically held most of the leadership roles in society, it is reasonable to expect such beliefs by participants in the experiment. 2 Besides gender, a leader's credibility is affected by other important factors, such as the procedure used to select the leader. In recent work, Brandts, Cooper, and Weber (2015) show that democratically-elected leaders are more effective than randomly-selected leaders, presumably because elected leaders are more legitimate. 3 We extend this line of work by studying whether male and female leaders benefit equally from being elected. 4 Since most elected leaders, such as members of parliament or heads of state are male, it is reasonable to hypothesize that elected female leaders do not benefit from the same increase in legitimacy as male leaders do.
To our knowledge, Grossman et al. (2016) is the only other study of gender differences in leadership in a coordination game. 5 Using a design similar to ours, they find that randomlyselected male leaders have a stronger impact on the behavior of followers than female leaders.
Moreover, for a given impact, male leaders receive better subjective evaluations and higher monetary bonuses from their followers.
1 Ertac and Gurdal (2012) demonstrate that female leaders make less risky decisions when making risky decisions for their team.
2 For evidence that widely-held gender stereotypes affect behavior in experiments, even when they are not true in the laboratory see Reuben, Sapienza, and Zingales (2014) and Bohnet, van Geen, and Bazerman (2016) . 3 In the context of cooperation, Levy et al. (2011) show that messages from democratically-elected leaders have a bigger impact on contributions to a public good game than those of randomly-selected leaders. More generally, there is a growing body of work showing that institutions are more effective if they are democratically-chosen (see Dal Bó 2014). 4 Even though followers do not formally vote to elect their leaders in many organizations, they are often consulted by those that do.
5 Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2005) study differences in coordination (without leaders) depending on the fraction of men and women in a team. Other papers study gender differences in leading by example in public good games. For example, Arbak and Villeval (2013) find that men and women are equally likely to lead as long as the leaders' gender is visible.
Our study extends the work of Grossman et al. (2016) in two important ways. 6 First, we consider gender differences between elected as well as randomly-selected leaders. Second, while in Grossman et al. (2016) a team has the same leader throughout the experiment, in this paper, a team selects a leader every three periods. We think that this is an important extension because, when combined with elections, it gives teams the opportunity to reelect leaders who perform well and dispense with those who do not. Moreover, studying gender differences in reelection is particularly interesting precisely because of Grossman et al. (2016) 's finding that male leaders are evaluated more leniently than female leaders. On one hand, this bias could cause lower reelection of successful female leaders, which would exacerbate initial gender differences. On the other hand, it could also result in higher reelection of unsuccessful male leaders, which would diminish initial gender differences.
Our main findings are as follows. We find that democratically-elected leaders are more effective than randomly-selected leaders. Initially, the benefit of being elected accrues only to male leaders. However, over time, this gender difference disappears because unsuccessful female leaders are reelected at considerable lower rates than unsuccessful male leaders.
The experiment
Each experimental session consists of 26 periods. At the beginning of a session, participants are randomly matched into teams of five and are informed that their team's composition will not change throughout the session. In each period, every participant ∈ {1,2,3,4,5} in a team simultaneously chooses an effort level ∈ {0,10,20,30,40}. Participant 's earnings are equal to Each session is divided into two parts. Part 1 consists of periods 1 to 8 and Part 2 of periods 9 to 26. Participants know the session has two parts but are not given the specific instructions of Part 2 until they reach that part.
In Part 1, participants play the minimum effort game without a leader. Given previous evidence with these parameters (Brandts, Cooper, and Weber 2015) , we expect teams will end up coordinating on the lowest effort level by the end of Part 1. By having teams fail to coordinate on high effort levels, we make the introduction of a leader more meaningful.
In Part 2, we introduce leaders. Specifically, every three periods, one participant in each team is selected to be the team's leader, which leaves the other team members as followers. The leader has the option to send a written message visible to all followers. The message is sent before the first period of the three-period leadership term. Leaders can write anything they wish, including nothing, except for content that could be used to identify them. Messages are non-binding in that not following a message has no direct effect on earnings. Leaders make effort decisions and face the same incentives as followers.
Leader selection
Leaders are selected with a two-step process. In the first step, each participant decides whether he or she would like to be a candidate for the leader position or not. In the second step, a leader is selected among the available candidates according to one the selection procedures described below. Candidates who are selected to be the leader receive 50 additional points. Participants who decide not to be a candidate play a lottery that pays 50 additional points with a 0.5 probability. 7 We randomly assigned teams to one of two leader-selection procedures. In the Random treatment, one of the candidates is randomly assigned to be the leader, each with equal probability. In the Election treatment, team members elect the leader by ranking each candidate. 
Gender information
To convey information about gender, we had participants chose a profile picture they identified with. This occurred after they consented to take part in the study but before they read the instructions to avoid strategic selection of profile pictures. We created 12 generic profile pictures for each gender using the profile creator website pickaface.net (see the Appendix.). All pictures had the same clothing, facial expression, face form, and eye color. We varied hair length, hair color, skin color, and did small modifications to the lips, nose, eyes, and hairstyle to match generic racial features. We use profile pictures to preserve anonymity whilst revealing gender. We opted for pictures that also contain other cues such as race and hairstyles to distract participants from discerning the purpose of the study (Zizzo 2010) , which can potentially lead to intentional changes in behavior (Camerer 2015).
We displayed the profile picture of all team members during the leader-selection process and of the leader in all subsequent screens. 9 Importantly, we provide this information in both Random and Election.
Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the Vernon Smith Center of Experimental Economics (VSCEE)
at Francisco Marroquín University. Participants were recruited through ORSEE (Greiner 2015) and the experiment was programed with z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). A session lasted around one hour. We used standard experimental procedures, including random assignment of subjects to treatments, anonymity, detailed instructions with control questions, dividers between the subjects' cubicles, and monetary incentives. Earnings were expressed in points and were converted to Guatemalan quetzals at a rate of 10 quetzals per 500 points. Average earnings equaled GTQ 100.23 ($14.53). Detailed experimental procedures are available in the Appendix.
Results
In total, 75 participants (15 teams) took part in Random, of which 36 were male and 39 were female. In Election, we had 70 participants (14 teams), of which 34 were male and 36 were female.
As expected, without a leader, none of the teams managed to coordinate at high effort levels.
By the last period of Part 1, the minimum effort in all 29 teams was zero. Moreover, if we compare either the teams' average effort or their average earnings in Part 1 depending on the treatment and gender of the leader at the beginning of Part 2, we do not find any statistically significant differences (two-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U tests, > 0.364 for effort and > 0.244 for earnings). In other words, since all teams are in the same situation at the beginning of Part 2, any subsequent differences in behavior can be attributed to differences that occurred after leaders
We first analyze the initial the effects of leadership, namely periods 9 to 11, in subsection 3.1.
Subsequently, in subsection 3.2, we analyze the same effects in periods 12 to 26. That is, after there have been opportunities for leaders to change. Given that we have clear directional hypotheses concerning the effect of elections and the leader's gender, from here on, we report values of one-tailed tests.
Initial effects of leadership (periods 9 to 11)
We start our analysis by looking at the decision to become a candidate. Is there a gender difference in the fraction of men and women who nominate themselves? In Random, 78% of men become candidates compared to 67% of women, while in Election, it is 79% of men and 75% of women. These gender differences are not statistically significant ( = 0.127 in Random and = 0.366 in Election), 10 suggesting that men and women are similarly willing to become leaders. In
Election, we can also ask the question, are male candidates more likely to be elected as leaders?
We find that the answer is no, 26% of both male and female candidates became leaders.
We now turn to the effect of leaders on the teams' ability to coordinate. On the left, Figure 1 depicts the fraction of times teams coordinate on the highest effort in periods 9 to 11. On the right, it displays mean earnings during the same periods. We concentrate on these two variables as they represent the best test for a leader (coordination on the highest effort) and the teams' welfare (earnings). Additional summary statistics are available in the Appendix.
Even though leaders of both genders in both treatments manage some coordination on the highest effort, male leaders in Election do considerably better. The same can be said about average earnings, which are around 45 points higher with male leadership in Election compared to the other cases. If we test whether these differences are statistically significant, we confirm that teams in Election do better with male leaders than with female leaders ( = 0.005 for coordination, = 0.016 for earnings) while teams in Random do not differ depending on the leader's gender ( = 0.335 for coordination, = 0.329 for earnings). Moreover, while male leaders do better when they are elected ( = 0.035 for coordination, = 0.017 for earnings), female leaders do not differ depending on the leader-selection procedure ( = 0.400 for coordination, = 0.436 for earnings). 11 In other words, we replicate previous findings that leadership immediately improves coordination on high effort and that this improvement is larger with elected leaders (Brandts, Cooper, and Weber 2015) . However, we find that the benefit of being elected is enjoyed exclusively by male leaders.
11 Probit regression for coordination on the highest effort and OLS regression for earnings. Both regressions use treatment×leader's gender dummy variables and cluster standard errors on teams. All the regressions in the paper are available in the Appendix. Next, we take a closer look at the leaders' messages and followers' behavior to understand why teams with elected male leaders do better. We concentrate on one specific type of message:
explicitly asking followers to choose the highest effort. The benefit of looking at this type of message is that it is easily coded and it has been shown by Brandts, Cooper, and Weber (2015) to be crucial for team coordination.
The first row of Table 1 shows that fraction of leaders who ask for the highest effort ranges from 71% of male leaders in Election to 43% of female leaders in Election. Even though this is a noticeable difference in the leaders' behavior, it is not statistically significant. 12 The subsequent rows of Table 1 show the fraction of teams that coordinate on the highest effort and the fraction of followers who choose the highest effort depending on the leader's message. Clearly, if a leader does not ask for the highest effort then followers do not choose high effort irrespective of the treatment or the leader's gender. By contrast, if a leader does ask for the highest effort, the followers' reaction varies significantly. Specifically, all the followers of elected male leaders follow the leader's request whereas a considerably smaller fraction does so if the leader is female or is randomly appointed. 13 We summarize these findings as our first result. 
Effects of leadership after reselection (periods 12 to 26)
Next, we evaluate whether the advantage of elected male leaders remains after leader reselection has taken place. Figure 2 and Table 2 present the same statistics as Figure 1 and Table 1 but for periods 12 to 26.
Over time, the advantage of elected male leaders over randomly-selected leaders decreases but still exists. By contrast, the performance of elected female leaders improves to the point that it equals that of their male counterparts (see Figure 2) . This results in a difference between elected and randomly-appointed leaders but no difference between male and female leaders. 14 Table 2 reveals why this is the case. Both male and female leaders almost always request the highest effort in Election but not in Random. 15 Moreover, over time, the differences in the reaction of followers to high-effort requests disappear.
14 Election vs. To conclude our analysis, we take a closer look at behavior in elections to understand why female leaders catch up with male leaders. Specifically, we look at whether the leaders' gender impacts the fraction of followers who challenge the leader by becoming candidates and the likelihood that the leader is reelected. Table 3 presents both statistics depending on whether the team coordinated on the highest effort during the leader's three-period term. Not surprisingly, leaders of successful teams are not challenged frequently and are likely to be reelected. For these teams, we do not observe significant gender differences ( > 0.197) . By contrast, we do find an important gender difference among unsuccessful teams. While unsuccessful male and female leaders are challenged at similar rates ( = 0.700), unsuccessful male leaders have a significantly higher chance of being reelected ( = 0.041). These findings are stated as our second result. 
Conclusions
We study the gender differences in the effectiveness of non-binding messages sent by team leaders in a minimum-effort game depending on whether a leader is elected or is randomly selected.
Our findings are partly consistent with those of Grossman et al. (2016) . We find a gender difference in the effectiveness of leaders but only for elected leaders and not for randomlyselected ones. Unfortunately, there are numerous design differences between the two studies to whether to become a candidate, leaders make an effort decision, messages are written instead of spoken, and leaders change every three periods. However, our findings do call for caution as they suggest that gender differences in leadership effectiveness are not general and depend on the precise context in which they are studied.
Like Grossman et al. (2016), we find compelling evidence that male and female leaders are evaluated differently for a given team performance. In our study, this bias results in weaker selection pressure among male leaders. Interestingly, lenience towards unsuccessful male leaders contributes to the disappearance of the initial gender difference in effectiveness. This result is a useful reminder that observing gender parity in an organization might in fact be due to gender disparities in evaluations. It also suggests that policies such as gender quotas might not only increase female representation but also the competence of male leaders (Baltrunaite et al. 2014) . The first section of the Appendix contains more detail about the experiment's procedures, including a detailed timeline, a sample of the instructions, and screenshots of the computer program. The second section contains descriptive statistics as well as the regressions reported in the main body of the paper.
A.1. Detailed experimental procedures
After their arrival to the laboratory, participants were assigned randomly to seats. Before period 1, and before reading the instructions, everybody answered a short general questionnaire about gender, race, age, years of study, and major field of studies. Next, participants had to choose a profile picture. Figure A1 contains the 24 profile pictures.
We had separate instructions for Part 1 and Part 2, and participants read the instructions only prior to each part. To facilitate calculations for the participants, we handed out printed versions of the instructions for Part 1, which contained a table showing how earnings were determined in each period. The same table applied in Part 2. Instructions were displayed on the computer screens and were read aloud by the experimenter. After reading the instructions for Part 1, participants completed a payoff quiz to check whether everybody understood the game's payoff structure. Participants completed a questionnaire about the volunteering and selection process after reading the instructions for Part 2. Instructions and screenshots can be found below.
The game was described using a workplace context to be in line with earlier papers, ease comprehension of the task, and enrich the wording and analysis of the free form messages (see Brandts and Cooper 2006) . As in Brandts, Cooper, and Weber (2015) , individual team members were referred to as "employee", and they were told that they were working for a "firm". The leader was called the "manager". Following Brandts, Cooper, and Weber (2015), we did not use the term "effort" because of its strong connotation. Instead, we asked participants to think of each period as a "workweek" lasting 40 hours and choose how many hours to devote to the firm's "bonus project".
Leaders could enter their messages into a chat box, and they could either click on a button to send the message or click on a button labeled as "Send no suggestion". The message, along with the leader's profile picture and ID number, was displayed on all screens throughout the three periods of a leadership term. We used the profile pictures along with unique ID numbers to display candidates and selected leaders to all team members. Participants knew from the instructions of Part 2 that the profile pictures will be displayed.
In Part 2 we elicited some of the participants' beliefs. After they decided whether to be candidate or not, we elicited their belief concerning the number of other candidates by asking "Out of the four other participants in your firm, how many will run for the Manager position?"
After participants made their effort choice, we elicited their belief concerning the number of other team members who will follow the leader's message by asking "Out of the four other participants in your firm, how many will follow the Manager's suggestion?" These belief questions were only asked in first period of each leadership term. Table A1 summarizes the sequence of events in the experiment.
At the end of each period, participants saw their effort choice, the team minimum effort, their earnings in that period, and their accumulated earnings. Participants could not observe individual effort choices. At the end of the experiment participants were shown their earnings in points and 
A.1.1. Sample instructions
Thank you for participating in this session. You are participating in a study on economic decision making and will be asked to make a number of decisions. Please read these instructions carefully as they describe how you can earn money.
All the interaction between you and other participants will take place through the computers.
Please do not talk or communicate in any other way with other participants. If you have a question, raise your hand and one of us will help you. The study is anonymous: that is, your identity will not be revealed to others and the identity of others will not be revealed to you.
During the study your earnings will be expressed in points. Upon completion of the session, your accumulated earnings will be converted from points to quetzals at a rate of 10 quetzals per 500 points. You will be paid these converted earnings in cash. The study is divided into two parts.
Your earnings will equal the sum of earnings from each part. You will be randomly assigned to a firm of five participants. You will be grouped with the same five participants throughout Part 1 and Part 2. Part 1 consists of 8 periods and Part 2 consists of 18 periods. You will read the instructions for Part 1. You will receive the instructions for Part 2 once Part 1 has been completed. 
Part 1
You are one out of five employees in a firm. Each period can be thought of as a workweek. Each employee spends 40 hours per week at their firm. In each period, every employee will be asked to choose how many hours to devote to the firm's bonus project. The available choices are 0 hours, 10 hours, 20 hours, 30 hours, and 40 hours.
The earnings for an employee are determined in each period by how many hours that employee spends on the bonus project, and the minimum number of hours employees in his or her firm spend on the bonus project. Specifically, the employee's earnings are reduced by 5 points per hour that he or she spends on the bonus project. In addition, the employee also receives a bonus equal to the minimum number of hours any employee in his or her firm spends on the bonus project multiplied by 6 points. Each employee also gets a flat payoff of 200 points in each period.
In other words, your earnings are given by the formula below:
-5 × your hours in bonus project + 6 × minimum hours in bonus project by any employee
To facilitate your calculations, the following Earnings Table shows At the end of each period you will receive a summary of what happened in the period including the number of hours you spent on the bonus project, the minimum number of hours chosen in the firm, your payoff for the latest period, and your accumulated payoffs for the current part. The computer also provides a summary of this information for preceding periods. At no point in time will we identify the identity of any employees in the firm. In other words, the actions you take will remain confidential. To ensure your understanding of these instructions, click the "READY"
button and answer the questions that will appear on your screen.
Part 2
Part 1 has ended. Read the instructions for Part 2 and click on READY once you are done. Part 2 is similar to Part 1. Now there will be 18 periods in Part 2. In each period, every employee will choose how many hours to devote to the firm's bonus project. Available choices are 0, 10, 20, 30
and 40 hours. The number of hours you choose and the minimum number of hours chosen in the firm will determine your earnings in that period. The Earnings Table is the same as in Part 1.
Finally, your firm's composition has not changed. In other words, in Part 2 you will interact with the same firm of five people as in Part 1.
The difference between Part 1 and Part 2 is that in every 3 periods there will be a selection and a message stage.
Selection stage
In the selection stage one person in your firm will be selected to be the Manager. The selection stage goes as follows:
 First, all employees decide whether they wish to run for the manager position. Employees who run are referred to as candidates.
 Thereafter, all employees (both candidates and non-candidates) vote to elect a manager.
During the vote, employees can identify the candidates by a randomly assigned id (a number between 1 and 5) and their chosen profile picture.
 Employees vote by ranking the candidates from most preferred to least preferred. For example, if there are three candidates, each employee has to assign one candidate the rank of 1 (most preferred), another candidate the rank of 2 (second most preferred), and the remaining candidate to the rank of 3 (least preferred). Note that candidates must also rank themselves when they vote.
 The candidate with the best average rank wins the election and becomes the manager. In case of a tie, the winner will be chosen randomly among the tied candidates.
 If none of the employees runs, then there is no election and the firm will not have a manager.
 If only one employee runs, then that employee automatically wins the election and becomes the manager.
Earnings from the selection stage
You can earn additional money in the selection stage. Additional earnings will be added to your total earnings at the end of the experiment.
 Employees who run for the manager position will earn 50 points if they win the election and 0 points if they lose the election.
 Employees who do not to run for the manager position will earn 50 points with 50% probability and 0 points otherwise. Whether you earn 50 points or 0 points is determined randomly by the computer.
You will be informed of the selection-stage earnings immediately after the election.
Message stage
After the vote, you will be informed whether you have been assigned the role of the Manager or the role of an Employee. The Manager's profile picture will be displayed on the computer screen.
In the message stage, the Manager will be able to send a written suggestion to all employees, or alternatively, he/she can decide not to send any suggestion. The suggestion cannot contain information that can be used to identify the Manager, such as a name, nickname, or any other identifying feature like clothing, or the desk number. Other than these restrictions, the Manager may write anything that he/she wishes. After the message stage, every employee will see the Manager's suggestion.
Subsequently, employees and managers play for 3 periods. In each period, each employee and the Manager enter the number of hours they wish to choose. Note that the suggestion does not commit you to any particular choice. That is, neither the Manager nor the other employees are required to choose the number of hours indicated in the suggestion.
After 3 periods, the manager reverts to being employee and there will be a new selection and message stage. Employees will make new decisions about candidacy and voting. Note that ids are fixed throughout Part 2. Table A2 contains descriptive statistics of the teams' minimum effort, the percentage of teams coordinating on the highest effort, the effort of individual participants, and individual earnings depending on the treatment, the gender of the leader, and whether the current leadership term is the first term with a leader or not. In all regressions, we use as independent variables the interaction of treatment (Election or Random), the gender of the leader in a period (male or female), and whether it is the team's first leadership term or not (periods 9 to 11 or periods 12 to 26). In addition, we also add dummy variables to identify periods in which teams had no leader because nobody chose to become a candidate, which occurred in 3 percent of all periods in Random and 2 percent in Election. In all regressions, we cluster standard errors on teams. The regressions in columns I and II include data from periods 9 to 26, while the regression in column II includes data from every third period in 
A.2. Additional statistical analysis
periods 9 to 26 (when messages could be sent). Note that the omitted category is teams with a male leader in periods 9 to 12 in Election. gender of the leader (male or female). In both regressions, we cluster standard errors on teams and include data from periods 9 to 12. Note that the omitted category is teams with a male leader in Election. Table A5 presents marginal effects (in percentages) from probit models testing the effect of a leader's gender on the likelihood that followers challenge the leader in the next election and the likelihood that leaders are reelected. In column I, the dependent variable equals one if a follower decides to become a candidate in the current election and zero otherwise. In column II, the dependent variable equals one if a candidate wins the current election and zero otherwise. In both regressions, we use, as independent variables, dummy variables to identify the gender of the leader in the previous three periods and whether the team was successful or unsuccessful (i.e., whether the team coordinated on the highest effort or not). Hence, we include a dummy variable that equals one if the previous leader was female and the team was unsuccessful, another dummy variable that equals one if the previous leader was male and the team was successful, and a last dummy variable that equals one if the previous leader was female and the team was successful.
Note that this means that the omitted category is a previous male leader and an unsuccessful team. In both regressions, we cluster standard errors on teams and include data from every election in periods 12 to 26 (the election in period 9 is not used since there is no previous leader). The regression in column I includes decisions only from followers while the regression in column II includes election outcomes only for leaders (i.e., to determine reelection). 
